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 A Centre for the Study of Human Rights 
report by Conor Gearty

1‘ The drawback of a closed seminar is that 
often remarkable contributions to 
contemporary thinking never get beyond 
the four walls of the room. This write-up, 
while respecting contributors’ anonymity, 
records an important discussion among 
knowledgeable contributors on a topic of 
central importance to our society.’
Lord Justice Stephen Sedley 
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Introduction
Between March 2005 and June 2007 the LSE Centre 
for the Study of Human Rights brought together 
leading ﬁ gures from academe, government and civil 
service, law and the judiciary, media and civil 
society in a series of six seminars. In October 2007 
the Centre invited many of these contributors to 
participate in a full day conference. This report is 
a reﬂ ection on those proceedings and a comment 
on the inter-relationship between terrorism law 
and human rights.
The aim of the seminar series was to consider the
proper role, if any, of non-governmental personnel
in the handling of national security issues within
the state. The objective was to develop a dialogue 
between government and non-governmental actors
on the management of issues related to national
security. Our purpose was to facilitate the forging
of an approach to the subject which achieves the
right balance between ofﬁ cials and others on
the one hand, and between principles (relating to
security and to democratic and legal accountability
for example) on the other.
With the exception of the ﬁ nal seminar, each
focused on the relationship with government
of one of the particular professional communities.
Participants at each of the seminars were sent
a background reading and a brieﬁ ng to provide
shape and direction for the discussion. 
The discussion was then summed up by
a designated rapporteur.
The sixth and ﬁ nal seminar was dedicated to
discussion of the place of the Human Rights Act
1998. This was in recognition of the role the HRA
had begun to play in relation to the creation and
assessment of new terrorism laws. 
5The success of this format in this context prompted
us to devise a further event devoted to structured
thinking and highly-focused discussion on the
challenge posed to human rights by terrorism
and by counter-terrorism law. ‘Human rights and
counter-terrorism: re-framing the debate’ was
a full day conference held on 5 October 2007.
The participants were in many cases the same
people involved in the seminar series – senior
politicians, members of the judiciary and civil
service, leading campaigners and lobbyists, 
journalists, commentators, academic and legal 
specialists. The idea behind the conference,
as it had been behind the seminar series, was
to break through the divides that lie between
the various actors engaged in the ﬁ eld of terrorism 
and human rights and thereby fruitfully to address 
the issues of concern to each in a frank and 
conﬁ dential environment. 
The Centre for the Study of Human Rights would
like to thank all those who took part in the seminar 
series and conference, and our funding partners, 
the New Security Challenges Programme of the 
Economic and Social Research Council. 
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The international context: 
a new precariousness
The role of human rights as the ethical lynchpin
of international affairs has been undisputed for 
generations. Placed on its throne above politics by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, 
we have all long become familiar with the idea that 
states need to be seen to be accommodating 
themselves to the imperatives of international 
human rights law. This global development has 
been mirrored at the regional and local levels,
with conventions on human rights and national 
constitutions protecting human or civil rights 
embedding themselves across nations. It is true 
that the priorities within this multi-faceted 
framework of human rights have been disputed
and that the departures from it have been many
and frequent, but neither of these facts has
caused the idea to be deprived of its privileged 
status. The challenges have been covert not overt, 
the manoeuvring around human rights evidence
not of its redundancy but of its supremacy: rights 
have long been so much a given that they have
been something to be evaded rather than simply 
rejected.
Things have now begun to change. An old foe has re-
emerged from the age of Westphalia, to dispute not 
just the application but also the prescriptive power 
of human rights law. Paradoxically, the end of the 
Cold War led to a ﬂ ight from rather than the rush to 
the global civil society that so many had predicted. 
National entities that had long been stiﬂ ed by 
imperial power recovered their identities from the 
distant past and declined immediately to trade 
them in. In the jig-saw of newly independent states 
that jostled for space on the maps of Europe, Asia 
and Africa in the 1990s, the question of national 
security stopped being a foreigner’s intrusion or an 
idealist’s fantasy and became once again a real 
issue, demanding an answer: What could be done to 
7secure borders from external aggression? How 
could a state be protected from the enemy, both 
within and without? In the demands of a 
rehabilitated concept of national security, 
indigenous leaders found a tempting tool for the 
justiﬁ cation of conduct that would otherwise have 
fallen foul of the entrenched global imperatives of 
human rights. It was during this decade of apparent 
supremacy in the immediate aftermath of 1989
that the seeds for an assault on human rights were
being quietly scattered about various national soils.
In the second year of the new Millennium, the 
elevation to the American presidency of George W 
Bush and the attacks by Al-Qaida on targets in the 
United States on 11 September 2001 became the 
two facts that were to give the insipient emergence 
of this new national security discourse a new lease 
of life. Already unsympathetic to international 
human rights law and to global human rights 
institutions, and indeed to the whole concept of the 
United Nations, the new Washington administration 
led the way in prioritising national security in its 
international, regional and national policy-making.
Afghanistan was attacked with a view to the 
overthrow of the government there on the basis of 
its sympathetic hosting of the Al-Qaida organisation 
within its territory. The regime of Saddam Hussein 
was brought down, not least because of the dangers 
it was said to present to US security. Neither action 
was channelled through the usual rules of global 
military engagement. Instead a new framework
of right conduct, rooted in security and national 
interest, was being hewn out of the fact of action.
The place of human rights was explicitly denied:
the camp at Guantanamo might have been designed 
as a large-scale exercise in the communication
of this fact. At home, the presidency took on the 
characteristics of a war administration and sought 
on this basis to rely on war precedents to justify the 
inapplicability of constitutional requirements to
its ‘counter-terror’-related activities. Not only was 
international human rights law set to one side, but 
so also were the basic rights to be found in the US 
bill of rights, with both being jettisoned not as an 
exercise in secret lawlessness but rather as the 
inevitable result of a grand theory about
executive power.
8Where the most powerful nation has gone, many 
states have since followed. The role of the United 
States in the era of international human rights has 
been controversial, certainly, but it has also always 
been pivotal, the hinge of commitment on which the 
whole ediﬁ ce has hung. Departing the ﬁ eld in this 
abrupt way, the US opened up – for the ﬁ rst time 
since 1948 – the whole question of the credibility
of international human rights. In the years that have 
followed, national security has, in growing numbers 
of places, increasingly trumped the considerations 
of human dignity, legality and democracy that are 
the bywords of the human rights mission. The ﬁ rst 
concern is often now centred on security, with 
human rights ﬁ tting in the conversation only insofar 
as they can be seen not to detract from this prior 
focus. Powerful nations that have accepted human 
rights on sufferance see an opportunity to make 
their hostility explicit without fear of effective 
contradiction. Self-interested rulers whose 
weakness does not allow them to put their own 
interest above that of their peoples package their 
insipient authoritarianism as ‘necessary counter-
terrorism’. While it may be to state the matter rather 
too baldly, with it being certainly too early to 
assume the demise of the human rights paradigm 
in its current shape, what is clear is that the present 
movement in international affairs is towards the 
taking on of this new form, one rooted in the 
national certainties of the past rather than the 
global ideals of a fast receding future. The primacy 
of human rights will not be evident in a framework 
constructed in this way; the idea will survive but
in a reduced or distorted form. Can this momentum 
be stalled or reversed?
Managing change
On the side of the old order is the politico-legal 
industry of human rights: the organisations, courts, 
committees and functionaries whose raison d’être 
lies in the continuing prominence of the idea which 
employs them. The United Nations is reaching 
towards an accommodation between its charter 
commitment to human rights and the threat from 
terrorism that is now thought to be so grave.
Various regional bodies, such as for example the 
Council of Europe and the European Union, are 
‘ Powerful nations that
have accepted human 
rights on sufferance see 
an opportunity to make 
their hostility explicit 
without fear of effective 
contradiction’
9wrestling with the challenge of preserving 
fundamental freedoms in light of the drift away
even from such basics as the taboo against torture 
and the prohibition on indeﬁ nite detention without 
charge. Caught up in similar dilemmas as well are 
the nation states of the established democracies.
These are places with a history of foundational 
political violence deep in their past, but also with
a commitment to the values of dignity, democracy 
and legality that go back much further than the
post war settlement epitomised in the Universal 
Declaration. There is an ongoing battle even in the 
United States itself between those who share the 
‘War on Terror’ vision of the White House and others 
(including a signiﬁ cant number of supreme court 
justices) for whom the attacks of 11 September
do not warrant a wholesale departure from tradition 
and the rule of law. Canada, Australia and other 
primarily English-speaking nations have found 
themselves in similar cross-institutional discussion 
in recent years, as have the countries that make-up 
what the former US Secretary of State for Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld once called ‘Old Europe’. 
The United Kingdom has not been exempt from the 
challenge of resolving this growing tension between 
human rights and the demands of counter-terrorism.
Indeed Britain has some particular characteristics 
which make the way in which it conducts itself in this 
ﬁ eld of exceptional importance. First, as the widely 
accepted original home of democracy and the rule
of law (in the shape that these two terms have taken 
in the modern era), the inﬂ uence of the United 
Kingdom in this sphere is out of all proportion to its 
size and to its economic power. The contemporary
term is ‘soft power,’ and the state that counts Magna 
Carta’s Runnymede and ‘the mother of parliaments’ 
among its possessions has a moral head-start in
any discussion about how to balance freedom and 
security. Second, the United Kingdom has new laws 
in force especially designed to support and protect 
human rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 took 
effect (on 2 October 2000) at exactly the moment 
when the foundations of its subject matter were 
about to be subjected to intense, post 11 September 
critical scrutiny. Third, and reﬂ ected in the 
successful enactment of legislation designed to 
support human rights, the United Kingdom has long 
had a vibrant civil society that has been particularly 
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concerned with issues of freedom and human 
rights. London is the home of, or at least
a key base for, many international NGOs devoted
to the protection of international human rights. 
Indigenous groups like Liberty and JUSTICE focus 
on the domestic environment but from a similar 
perspective as their international counterparts. 
New human rights commissions are gradually 
coming on stream, each with terms of reference 
that require them explicitly to engage in human 
rights work across the public and private sectors. 
And fourthly, thanks to the problem of Northern 
Ireland, the UK has long form in the ﬁ eld of
counter-terrorism. Since as early as 1968, when 
subversive and other forms of political violence
ﬁ rst began to appear in Belfast and across
the Province, the authorities in Britain have had
to connect their commitment to human rights 
(rhetorical but also diplomatic and legal even
before the 1998 Act) with the exigencies of
a struggle against ‘terrorism’ that has often
seemed to demand movement in the opposite 
direction. 
If the new perspectives on security and human 
rights accelerated into prominence by the attacks 
of 11 September 2001 were not novel to the British 
authorities, the nature of the potential harm
to which the country was now said to be vulnerable 
was perceived by those in responsible positions
to be far more serious than in the past, and to be 
accompanied by levels of (high) probability of 
occurrence that demanded strong legislative action. 
Many in civil society, and particularly those in civil 
libertarian and human rights organisations, have 
refused to accept the government’s assessment
of risk or (if they have accepted it) to concede that
it warrants the statutory proposals that it has 
produced. Senior judges have from time to time 
expressed a similar point of view through the cases 
they have had to decide under the Human Rights 
Act, as have parliamentarians, the latter often
in sufﬁ cient numbers to force the government
to scale back its counter-terrorism plans.
The result has been an ongoing trilateral ping-pong 
match between the branches of the state, with the 
government proposing, then amending after a 
parliamentarian revolt, and then revisiting in light
of this or that legal challenge, powers that it 
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claimed at the start were essential to the security of 
the state, with all of this being played out in the full 
glare of a lively and engaged civil society. Language 
has become heated. Alarmist talk has become 
routine. Positions have been adopted from which it 
has been hard to resile. In short, the parties to the 
discussion have become used to regarding each 
other as further apart than they in fact are. 
Predictions of mutual estrangement, however, have 
a habit of become self-fulﬁ lling; trapped by extreme 
language on all sides, the trust essential to rational 
discussion drains away with the various participants 
drifting from the mainstream of dialogue into the 
cul-de-sac of non-negotiable but mutually exclusive 
truths. 
Searching for common 
ground
This report is the ﬁ nal outcome of a process that 
began four years ago and which was initiated and 
then fuelled by a single overriding idea: that the 
challenge of terrorism to human rights is too 
important, and Britain’s place within that discourse 
too central, to allow discussion of it to wander
off into irrelevance, and that therefore a way had
to be found to bring the principal actors on all sides 
together for a proper interchange, unclogged by the 
public positioning and the mistrust that had begun 
to suffocate debate. Fortunately a happy precedent 
was to hand. In the darkest days of the Northern 
Ireland conﬂ ict, when British and Irish government 
ofﬁ cials barely spoke to each other and politicians
in the Province paraded their enmity to the world
as part of their vote-catching appeal, a small group 
of academics, senior journalists and business 
p’eople created a parallel universe in which dialogue 
was nurtured and genuine debate and discussion 
assiduously fostered between these various 
opposites. Protected from the noise outside by rules 
of conﬁ dentiality and the shared commitment of its 
invited participants, the British-Irish Association’s 
annual conference in an Oxford or Cambridge 
college managed to see out the Troubles as a hidden 
ﬁ xture of sane debate in a calendar too often 
marked by calamity. Its covert conversations 
between public antagonists may even have played 
some part in changing the political atmosphere in 
‘ Predictions ofmutual 
estrangement have a habit 
of become self fulﬁ lling;
trapped by extreme 
language on all sides, the 
trust essential to rational 
discussion drains away 
with the various 
participants drifting from 
the mainstream of dialogue 
into the cul-de-sac of non-
negotiable but mutually 
exclusive truths.’
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‘ These seminars brought 
together people from
a range of different 
perspectives in an 
environment which 
fostered the kind of 
debate these questions
need and deserve’
Matt Cavanagh, Ofﬁ ce of 
the Prime Minister
Northern Ireland. Certainly resolution of the precise 
issue that the Association particularly addressed – 
how to speak honestly in a political discourse 
pockmarked by violence – was critical to delivery
of the Good Friday Agreement and the various 
political resolutions that have followed that 
remarkable document.
With the support of the Economic and Social 
Research Council, the LSE Centre for the Study of 
Human Rights decided to apply the Irish model to 
the contemporary ﬁ eld of terrorism and human 
rights. Instead of a residential conference, the 
organisers ﬁ xed upon six seminars spread over two 
years, focusing on the role of various elements of 
civil society in the protection of national security, 
with a larger conference at the conclusion of the 
seminar series drawing together all the threads. 
The participants, never more than thirty at each 
seminar (though rather more at the ﬁ nal 
conference) and invariably a differently composed 
group at each meeting, came from the senior ranks 
of government, the judiciary and the media as well 
as politics, law, academe and the civil liberties and 
human rights groups. And they did all come, on the 
whole: the Centre had never been involved in 
anything before with such a high rate of afﬁ rmative 
replies. Neither the conference nor any of the six 
seminars, ﬁ ve held at LSE and the sixth (speciﬁ cally 
on the Human Rights Act) in Parliament, ever 
produced a single leaked story to any media.
1 The seminars and ﬁ nal conference also made
a remarkably good ﬁ st of getting away from the 
surface news and delving deeply into the exact 
nature of the challenge that contemporary forms
of political violence pose for the democratic state.
Trust
The ﬁ rst central theme to emerge was familiar and 
expected. It is well known that after the invasion
of Iraq was found to have been largely based on
a false prospectus – the non-existent weapons
of mass destruction –, belief in what the authorities 
assert on questions of national security has 
reached a very low ebb. Less appreciated has been 
how damaging this has been for counter-terrorism 
in particular, deepening a scepticism that was 
1  A general account of each





already prevalent in civil society. The seminars 
revealed the extent to which disbelief (rather than 
mere doubt) has become the standard response
not only of many activists but also a substantial 
number of those in university and the media.
A particularly dramatic moment was when a 
journalist asserted that ‘the deployment of tanks 
[at Heathrow] came one day before the biggest 
march against the war in Iraq leading many to 
suggest a link’, the comment provoking ﬁ rst an 
exasperated snort from a very senior ofﬁ cial who 
had been intimately involved in the deployment,
and then a brief but impassioned discourse on
what in his view had really happened (deﬁ nitely
no conspiracy). 
The current government is to some extent paying
a price for the escalatory language of its 
predecessors in ofﬁ ce. So when it was announced 
by the Home Ofﬁ ce (on 25 July 2007), for example, 
that we face a ‘real and severe’ threat of terrorism 
which is ‘not just quantitatively different but 
qualitatively different from previous threats’, the 
kind of people who set the tone of the civil 
libertarian response know that the same was said 
of the Fenians in the 1860s, the anarchists a few 
decades later, Carlos and Abu Nidhal in the 1970s 
and 1980s and the IRA pretty well all the time since 
the late 1960s. They are also aware that the latest 
way of causing mass casualties in an asymmetrical 
conﬂ ict – whether it be dynamite, Semtex, the car 
bomb, a remote controlled explosions or the suicide 
bomber – is always described at the time of its 
occurrence as uniquely threatening and dangerous. 
The groups behind such attacks are invariably said 
to be numerous, well organised and desperate, and 
to be about to embark on some vast campaign of 
violence which requires immediate legislative 
action. The Home Secretary of 1939 Sir Samuel 
Hoare got draconian legislation through Parliament 
in the Summer of 1939 by exciting MPs about
the IRA’s special ‘S-Plan’ of devastation. In 1996, 
legislation was suddenly essential to prevent
an imminent IRA campaign of violence to 
commemorate Easter 1916 which never 
materialised. Asked in one of the seminars about 
why there was so much legislation of this sort,
a former Cabinet minister who had had direct 
responsibility in the area (not Labour) 
‘ Professor Gearty managed 
to assemble a near unique 
mix of central protagonists 
in Britain’s security debate. 
The resulting discussions 
were both rigorous and 
reﬂ ective. Few opinions, 
no matter how developed 
or polarised can have been 
completely unaffected by 
the high quality of 
discussion.’ 
Shami Chakrabarti, Director 
of Liberty
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acknowledged that on some occasions ‘the 
motivation was to be seen by the public as
‘doing something’ in the aftermath of an atrocity, 
[and] that a swift response had the effect of 
boosting morale and restoring public conﬁ dence’. 
Others recalled that it is also a convenient way
of sneaking unpalatable provisions through 
parliament, as happened in 1996 and again in 1998 
(after Omagh) and 2001 (after the 11 September 
attacks). If counter-terrorism rhetoric were
a currency, it would by now have lost all its value 
through inﬂ ation. 
It is difﬁ cult but not impossible for government to 
counter these levels of scepticism, both about its 
diagnosis of the terrorism threat and concerning 
the correct legislative response. The Brown 
government has made a good start by committing 
itself to various changes in the development of 
national security policy (in the Governance of 
Britain, July 2007) and by then responding with 
calculated, unfrenzied intelligence to the serious 
efforts at political violence in London and Glasgow 
with which militants sought to mark the change 
from Blair to Brown. But the lesson of the seminars 
is that this tone needs to be carried deeper and 
more consistently into the realms of government, 
with fewer generalised Doomsday interviews of the 
sort with which Lord West of Spithead marked his 
appointment as Home Ofﬁ ce minister with special 
responsibility for security (on the BBC Radio 4 
Today programme on 16 July 2007). It is also 
alarming that the country’s then top anti-terrorism 
police ofﬁ cer should stand accused by the ofﬁ cial 
oversight body of having deliberately mislead the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner about the 
Stockwell shooting of Brazilian Jean Charles de 
Menezes in July 2005: if he can deceive his boss 
about such a matter what on earth does he feel he 
can say to us? Taking their cue from senior ranks, 
the police need to set aside the idea that 
incantation of the phrase ‘counter-terrorism’ allows 
them to do what they want, whether it be 
demanding new laws, overusing special powers, 
jumping to conclusions about ‘terrorist’ suspects
or even shooting them down in the street. 
When discussing terrorism threats the police need 
also to be less alarmist, less willing to take short-
‘the motivation was to be 
seen by the public as 
‘doing something’ in the 
aftermath of an atrocity’
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cuts with the facts and more focused on the need
to fortify their arguments with a clear evidential 
base. One excellent example of this is recorded in
a report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
which came out at the end of July 2007 (‘Counter-
terrorism Policy and 28 Days, Intercept and Post-
charge Questioning’) On a visit to Paddington Green 
police station and after being given the usual line 
about why longer periods of pre-charge detention 
are needed, the argument about the time taken
to examine hard drives of computers seized from 
terrorist suspects, the committee asked for ﬁ gures 
or at least ‘a rough indication’ of how many suspects 
had been released and then been re-arrested or 
sought for re-arrest because of what had come
to light in just such an examination after the 28 days 
had elapsed. The question obviously caused some 
puzzlement. Members were told in response that 
‘one ofﬁ cer could think of one such situation, but 
that ‘no data [was] kept to capture this set of 
circumstances.’’ Trust cannot be rebuilt on such
a vague basis; for the sins of their predecessors, 
ministers, police ofﬁ cers and ‘counter-terrorist 
supremos’ of various sorts need to do penance in 
the basement of empirical data if they are to be 
once again taken on trust not only by the kind of 
people who came to these LSE seminars but by the 
general public as well. It is because this is now so 
widely realised that the commitment of the Brown 
administration to a forty day plus detention before 
charge policy is exciting so much animosity across 
the political parties and in civil society as well.
Assessing the threat
A second major theme thrown up by the series 
concerned the exact nature of the threat posed by 
contemporary terrorism. Interestingly given the 
seminars were all held with Mr Blair still in No 10, 
participants generally agreed that there was no 
great clash of civilisations fuelling some kind of 
existentially necessary ‘war on terror’: in this
regard most speakers anticipated the rather more 
restrained vocabulary (so far) of Blair’s successor. 
Indeed even fairly restricted efforts to identify 
Britishness as a basis for a more focused human 
rights law foundered, with a multiple of 
interventions from non-Brits when the point came 
‘ the police need to set 
aside the idea that 
incantation of the phrase 
‘counter-terrorism’ allows
them to do what they 
want’
‘ The discussion that came 
out of the seminar was 
extremely interesting, 
and provided a valuable 
opportunity to hear the 
views of people from very 
different perspectives’ 
Tazeen Said, British Muslim 
Human Rights Centre.
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up in one session, thereby proving not only the 
cosmopolitanism of the United Kingdom but also 
the difﬁ culty the government is likely to encounter
if it drives forward its ideas about national identity. 
True a number of Muslim participants saw things 
differently, and in doing so made some disturbing 
(albeit rather generalised) claims about the 
estrangement of Muslim communities: one seminar 
was told that there were areas where Muslim and 
Asian inhabitants are ‘absolutely terriﬁ ed’ of the 
police and there was a ‘terror factor’ at work in 
these places. In a particularly gripping exchange,
a sociologist well-known for his work on the Irish
in Britain in the 1970s drew parallels with the plight 
of Muslims today. But on the whole participants 
shared the view of the authorities that things are 
different how: ‘we are trying to learn and be more 
sensitive’ was how one senior ofﬁ cial put it, while
a police speaker pointed to the statistics on the use 
of police power as revealing a far different story 
than that of the 1970s, while also conceding that 
some things had gone wrong (eg the expulsion of 
Walter Wolfgang from the Labour party conference 
hall in 2005: entirely ‘cock-up’ and not conspiracy).
It was clear that some of the differences in 
perception ﬂ owed from language. Leading 
representatives from both the print and 
broadcasting media agreed on the tendentious 
reach of the term ‘terrorist’ when used to describe 
someone in advance of their conviction for a crime: 
this is a phrase carrying a strong sense of obloquy 
within itself with which no one nowadays (unlike
in the 19th century) wants to be associated.
 Also problematic is the further question of the
kind of ‘terrorism’ that is being discussed.
In Northern Ireland, IRA (or at a stretch Republican) 
violence eventually became a useful way of 
describing this brand of political violence, far better 
than the early (and alienating) ‘Irish’ and/or 
‘Catholic’ labels. Perhaps ‘Jihadist’ or ‘Islamicist’ 
will eventually ﬁ ll this descriptive gap today: it is 
hard to see ‘Al-Qaida’ working as an accurate 
preface and ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ terrorism are both 
over-broad and because of this insulting to the 
large, law-abiding majority in these faith groups. 
However denial of the origins of this violence 
altogether seemed to some to be an eccentric and 
artiﬁ cial over-reaction.
‘ This report is a hugely
important and novel 
contribution to one of the 
most challenging issues of 
our times. It draws on the 
insights and experience of 
a range of participants who 
have directly grappled with 
the vexed issue of terrorism 
and human rights.’
Francesca Klug OBE, Equality and 
Human Rights Commission and 





A third theme addressed the related issues of why 
we have had so many terrorism laws since 2001
and what their real impact has been on traditional 
civil liberties and (to use the modern term) human 
rights. What emerged very clearly from the seminars 
is that counter-terrorism legislation is often the 
product of a combination of factors that come 
together to create a strong momentum for action 
that leads to new laws even in situations where 
action is not necessarily required. This is not only 
about the enactment of laws for presentational 
purposes. A conservative risk assessment by 
security advisers combines with the politician’s 
awareness of the political danger that ﬂ ows from 
ignoring such advice to produce an agenda for 
change which is difﬁ cult to resist. The violent group 
said to be the cause of the threat can be relied upon 
to add to its own importance (through videos, 
interviews, or the web for example) by corroborating 
ofﬁ cial descriptions of itself and grandly warning
of horrors that are just around the corner. Time and 
again in the seminars we were reminded of the 
‘enormous’ pressure on ministers, rooted in a fear 
that some catastrophic event might occur for which 
their inaction is held to be causative and of their 
awareness as well that, generally speaking, the 
public would go much further than they would so far 
as stringent anti-terrorism laws are concerned.
This last point was brought home starkly by a 
British Social Attitudes Survey published in January 
2007 (and conducted once again by the Centre for 
the Study of Human Rights with ESRC support, this 
time in partnership with the National Centre for 
Social Research 2): there has over the past twenty 
years or so been a signiﬁ cant drop in the number
of people in Britain who adopt civil libertarian 
attitudes, and that even this group declines still 
further when the threat of a terrorist attack is 
added to the mix. It takes rare political courage for 
Terrorism Act 2000
Created new offences of inciting terrorism and 
seeking or providing terrorist training. Enhanced
police powers, including stop and search. Outlawed 
terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida.
‘ These fascinating events 
achieved something quite 
rare: completely frank 
exchanges between actors 
of inﬂ uence from every 
sector. Invaluable.’
Sir Ken Macdonald QC, Director
of Public Prosecutions
2  Mark Johnson and Conor Gearty 
‘Civil Liberties and the Challenge of 
Terrorism’ in A Park, J Curtice, 
K Thomson, M Phillips and M 
Johnson (eds), British Social 





a politician to emerge from the scene of an atrocity 
and declare there is no need for any new laws
or that they were right not to have ‘improved’ the old 
law despite this attack; and as all politicians know 
(but few academics and journalists and civil society 
activists appreciate) courage is uncomfortably 
close to political suicide on every democratic 
landscape.
Whatever their rationale, to be enacted and then
to work effectively, anti-terrorism laws in Britain 
need to negotiate their way effectively through a 
triple lock of restraints that work together to inhibit 
their repressive potential. A fascinating aspect of 
the seminars was the chance they gave to explore 
exactly how these constraints operated in practice: 
behind closed doors there were few if any claims
by our participants that we in Britain are at the 
moment living in a police state or that – to quote
a senior clerical intervention some months ago that 
drew a response from Downing Street – we suffer
in the same way as Ugandans had done under the 
presidency of Idi Amin. The ﬁ rst lock is 
constitutionalism, the commitment of those who 
exercise power within the system that there are 
certain things you do not do even if you have the 
power to do them. The Brown administration has 
perhaps shown a grasp of this. Its inclination to 
legislate for pre-charge detention for up to 42 days 
on suspicion of terrorism is rightly controversial
but critics need also to note what is not being 
suggested: not indeﬁ nite detention or even 90 days; 
no repeal of the Human Rights Act or amendment of 
any of its provisions; no suggestion that European 
Court of Human Rights decisions be disregarded, 
even where their effect is to stop the deportation
of suspected terrorists from the United Kingdom;
no proposal to move the human rights law onto an 
emergency basis which would allow for derogation 
from key rights; and none of the wide stop and 
questions powers that were ﬂ oated by Dr John Reid 
as Home Secretary as recently as May 2007.
The issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained 
as a result of torture, which was a big concern in the 
ﬁ rst couple of our seminars, has receded from the 
front-line of debate, and no one suggests that 
arguments for such a pernicious practice should
be revived.
‘ over the past twenty years 
or so been a signiﬁ cant 
drop in the number of 
people in Britain who adopt 
civil libertarian attitudes, 
and this group declines still 
further when the threat of 
a terrorist attack is added 
to the mix.’
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All of these omissions represent real civil libertarian 
progress, the operation in practice of unwritten 
constitutional assumptions in favour of respect
for human rights and the rule of law. While it is true 
that Mr Blair does not appear to have felt 
constrained in quite this way, he did respect the 
second and third locks that stand between 
executive desire on the one hand and realised, 
enforceable law on the other. These involve the 
legislative and judicial branches of the state, and
it has been the game of counter-terrorism ping-
pong already mentioned that these branches have 
been playing with the executive that has been 
responsible for so many of the laws enacted since 
the attacks of 11 September 2001. But this is 
democracy in action, not the deﬁ ance of democracy 
that so many of Mr Blair’s critics (focusing only
on his high-blown language and not on what was 
actually happening) managed at the time to 
convince themselves was the case.
The controversial Part IV of the Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001, which allowed for the 
detention of ‘suspected international terrorists’ 
without charge, was as much a result of human 
rights law as the attacks of 11 September. Case-law 
at the European Court of Human Rights (which the 
United Kingdom is bound as a matter of 
international law to respect) was clear that a state 
could not forcibly remove non-nationals from their 
territory if the only place to which they were able
to go was to a country where they would be at risk
of being seriously ill-treated.3 Not being able to get
rid of people whom the security services were 
(presumably) saying were likely terrorist activists
or sympathisers, but without sufﬁ cient admissible 
evidence to be able to bring criminal charges 
against them, the then Home Secretary David 
Blunkett decided to ask parliament for the power
to lock them up. Even though foreigners rather than 
citizens were involved, parliament only agreed to 
this after adding various safeguards to the measure,
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
Extended executive powers over assets and bank 
accounts of suspected terrorist individuals and
organisations. Granted home secretary powers to 
detain indeﬁ nitely without charge foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorist activities.
3  Chahal v United Kingdom 15 
November 1996
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and it was one of these, the requirement for
a review of the power by a committee of privy 
counsellors, that set in train the sequence of events 
that was eventually to destroy the legislation. 
This committee asked the kind of detailed questions 
about the exact need for the measure that, as we 
earlier saw, make the police and security specialists 
in the ﬁ eld uncomfortable: at home in the rhetoric 
of counter-terrorism, they proved much less 
persuasive on the small print. The hostile privy 
counsellors’ report (in December 2002) was 
followed by the decision of the appellate committee 
of the House of Lords (the law lords) on 16 
December 2004 4 that the detention without charge 
and the discrimination against foreigners which
was inherent in Part IV of the 2001 Act offended
the guaranteed human rights set out in the Human 
Rights Act 1998.
This judicial decision was widely read as evidence
of how far the Blair regime had drifted from its early 
commitment to human rights, with the judges 
heroically taking on an authoritarian regime in the 
name of freedom. It is true that the speeches
of the law lords in the majority were a brilliant 
exposition of the importance of the requirement
of rationality in decision-making: no government 
advocate could answer satisfactorily the question 
why it was thought right to detain indeﬁ nitely 
foreign suspected terrorists while ignoring all their 
domestic equivalents – had no suspects at all being 
born in Britain? But the 2001 Act had been enacted 
within the framework of human rights law not
(as with its international law equivalent in the US)
in deﬁ ance of it. The government had lodged a 
derogation from the European Convention’s terms 
with the Council Of Europe (the body responsible for 
the European Convention on Human Rights) and had 
sought to do the same under the terms of the 
Human Rights Act itself. When this derogation was 
found wanting by the law lords, Ministers did not 
have to follow the ruling because the Human Rights 
Act does not allow the courts to strike down primary 
legislation; all the judges are permitted to do is to 
issue non-binding declarations of incompatibility 
which is what had happened here.
The government therefore had a choice: it could 
have toughed out the political ﬂ ak and stuck with 
‘ no government advocate 
could answer satisfactorily 
the question why it was 
thought right to detain 
indeﬁ nitely foreign 
suspected terrorists while 
ignoring all their domestic 
equivalents’




the legislation or it could have changed it to make it 
ﬁ t the judges’ perception of what human rights law 
required. It chose the latter, introducing new anti-
terrorism control orders the following Spring in 
legislation that, after a huge quarrel with 
parliament, was ﬁ nally enacted as the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005. This is not the law the then 
Home Secretary Charles Clarke (successor to Mr 
Blunkett who had been forced to resign for other 
reasons at the time of the lords ruling on Part IV) 
had wanted: it is replete with safeguards for human 
rights and with far stronger judicial oversight than 
he had originally desired. As a result of these 
concessions – necessary to secure passage of the 
legislation – there have been many negative rulings 
from the courts on the speciﬁ cs of particular 
control orders, quashing them on account of their 
disproportionate impact on the human rights of 
those upon whom they have been imposed. 
(Quashing in this way is possible because the 
speciﬁ c orders are made by ministers and so are not 
protected in the way acts of parliament themselves 
are protected: the scheme itself has been held to 
comply with the Human Rights Act.) There have 
been far fewer control orders than was feared at the 
time of enactment of the legislation and none at all 
that have sought consciously to derogate from the 
state’s human rights obligations. Where the orders 
have been struck down there has been no 
suggestion from government that it will do other 
than obey the law.
Exactly the same pattern has been evident with the 
ﬁ nal piece of legislation promoted by the Blair 
government in this area. The Terrorism Act 2006, 
was introduced as a response to the July 2005 
attacks in London, and was promoted by the prime 
minister in the apocalyptic terms of a man who 
really believed he had an existential crisis on his 
hands. But once again Parliament did its 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
Introduced ‘control orders,’ after law lords rule that 
indeﬁ nite detention of foreign terrorist suspects
without charge is contrary to the Human Rights Act. 
Control orders allow the government to restrict the 
activities of individuals it suspects of involvement in 
terrorist activities, but for whom there is not 
sufﬁ cient evidence to charge.
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constitutional duty, diluting initially ludicrous 
provisions to prohibit the celebration of past 
‘terrorist’ events (unless they were approved 
terrorism like the execution of an English King or 
the armed rebellion abroad of a now admired 
political leader) and simply refusing to give the 
police the blank cheque that they – with the prime 
minister’s support – had demanded on security 
issues (in the form of a 90 day pre-charge 
detention period). Blair did not reject any of this as 
a true authoritarian leader would: he simply but 
nevertheless strongly disagreed. Nor even on such 
an incendiary issue as the blocking by the courts 
of the removal of suspected terrorists was he ever 
as openly deﬁ ant as was, say, Kenneth Baker 
when as Home Secretary he ignored a court order 
prohibiting him from expelling a Zairean asylum 
seeker from the country. 5 Of course Blair did not 
like these decisions, scribbled on the margins of 
brieﬁ ngs about them and generally sought to get 
round them: but he did not ﬂ out them.
Gordon Brown and his ministerial teams at the 
Home Ofﬁ ce and the new Justice ministry are 
therefore not departing from the Blair substance 
in this ﬁ eld of counter-terrorism as much as is 
commonly believed. What is already clear, though, 
is that the style promises to be different. Two 
position papers issued on 25 July 2007, on 
‘Possible measures for inclusion in a future 
counter terrorism bill’ and ‘Options for pre-charge 
detention in terrorist cases’ respectively, show a 
government that has a perspective but which has 
yet deﬁ nitely to determine how best to proceed 
while being clearly determined not to browbeat. 
Having agitated so long for more involvement, 
Parliament will now have to share some of the 
national security risk: with the right to participate 
in decision-making comes the responsibility to do 
so (to use a favourite Blairism) sensibly. To 
describe all this as evidence that Mr Brown 
represents ‘a far greater threat to civil liberties’ 
than his predecessor because his attack on 
freedom is subtler, as a leading journalist/
commentator did in an Observer article last 
Summer (29 July 2007), is to demonstrate such a 
failure of understanding of how democracy works 
as to risk giving all civil libertarians a bad name. 
‘ The Terrorism Act 2006, 
was introduced as a 
response to the July 2005 
attacks in London, and 
was promoted by the 
prime minister in the 
apocalyptic terms of a 
man who really believed 
he had an existential
crisis on his hands.’
5 M v Home Ofﬁ ce [1994] 1 AC 377.
23
Lessons from abroad
The Centre sought in each of its seminars to have 
specialist contributions from other jurisdictions. 
Throughout the series, invited practitioners and 
academics from around the world were given an 
opportunity to provide their own insights on the 
problems which Britain faces. This comparative 
dimension was the centrepiece of the ﬁ nal 
conference held at LSE on 5 October 2007. Entitled 
‘Human Rights and Counter-terrorism: Reframing 
the Debate’, the event was before an invited 
audience of specialists in the ﬁ eld (drawn from the 
ranks of government, academe, the civil service, the 
legal professions and the NGOs). In the main 
morning session, specialists from the US (Deborah 
Pearlstein), France (Antoine Garapon) and Australia 
(Andrew Lynch) were asked to address three issues 
in particular: extraordinary rendition; the use in 
prosecutions of intercept evidence; and the nature 
of emergency powers.
Garapon reminded the audience of how ﬂ exibly 
state power could be deployed in France. He was 
especially intent upon dissuading his listeners from 
coming to the opinion that Britain was somehow or 
other to be thought of as a ‘police state’. His 
exposition of continental (in particular French) law 
was a keen demonstration of the importance of a 
full understanding of context in any effort to 
translate the apparent virtues of one system 
effortlessly into another. As far as the US was 
concerned, Pearlstein argued that the Bush 
administration’s initial response to the events of 11 
September was misguided in the way in which it 
asserted the virtues of unlimited executive 
discretion in counter-terrorism operations. As the 
failures in those efforts over the past several years 
have made clear – including the high international 
political price paid for executive operations like  
Terrorism Act 2006
Drawn up after 7/7 bombings. Extended the pre-
charge detention period for terrorist suspects from 
14 to 28 days. Introduced a prohibition on the 
‘gloriﬁ cation’ of terrorism, as well as new offences 
of preparing terrorist acts and distributing terrorist 
publications.
‘ with the right to 
participate in decision-
making comes the 
responsibility to do so
(to use a favourite Blairism) 
sensibly.’
‘ The LSE conference 
offered high quality 
discussion on a rigorous 
intellectual template. 
I believe that its 
unprejudiced conceptual 
approach inﬂ uenced the 
policy makers present’
Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, 
Independent reviewer of counter-
terrorism legislation
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extraordinary renditions –, following the law set by 
Congress and interpreted by the courts is not only 
consistent with security, it is essential for effective 
counter-terrorism over the long term. In reporting on 
Australia, Andrew Lynch explained that despite the 
lack of any constitutional mechanisms through 
which rights could be curtailed in times of 
emergency in that country, the response to 
terrorism has been marked by repeated assertions 
of exceptionalism and urgency. In the absence of 
any formal instrument of rights protection, this 
rhetoric was deployed to ensure that the 
parliamentary process would impose very little 
check upon the enactment of an array of legislative 
initiatives which in combination notably impacted 
upon freedoms of movement, speech, association 
and privacy. Although the ability of Australian 
agencies and police to gather intercept and stored 
communications has been greatly expanded in 
recent years, this has yet to be a signiﬁ cant factor in 
the trial of terrorism suspects.
Chaired by Emeritus Professor Carol Harlow (LSE), 
the presentations, each tightly focused and limited 
to ﬁ fteen minutes, stimulated a discussion in which 
the mainly UK audience was able to reﬂ ect on 
domestic issues in light of the fresh learning 
brought to the matter under scrutiny by the 
comparative perspective. After a buffet lunch in 
LSE’s Shaw Library, the entire afternoon was taken 
up with an address by Lord Alex Carlile (the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws) followed 
by a question and answer session and then a free-
ﬂ owing discussion of the whole area, chaired by 
Conor Gearty. It was at this session that the various 
expert engagements of the audience, stimulated by 
the address by Lord Carlile and the morning 
proceedings (involving not only the comparative 
presentations but also a debate between Conor 
Gearty and Lawrence Freedman on the utility of 
terrorism laws), produced a fast-ﬂ owing series of 
interventions which succeeded, as the organisers 
hoped would be the case, in getting under the skin 
of current discussions on terrorism and human 
rights and in probing deeply into the challenges the 
former poses for the latter in modern Britain. 
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Deep structures
There are two threads which are consistently 
present in contemporary counter-terrorism law and 
practice in the United Kingdom, the ﬁ rst running 
with, the second against the grain of human rights 
law and civil liberties protection. The two are at 
odds with each and it is not yet clear down which of 
these routes the Brown administration will travel: 
everything is still up for grabs. The ﬁ rst is the 
criminal process road. It reﬂ ects the origins of our 
terrorism law as primarily a policing matter. From 
this perspective, the goal of counter-terrorism law is 
punitive, the punishment of offenders for politically 
motivated harm which they have done, or are about 
to do, or are conspiring with or inciting others to 
commit. ‘Harm’ is deﬁ ned by the criminal law, not 
only in its classic form (substantive offences like 
murder, manslaughter and criminal damage) but 
also in the broader shape that the particular 
challenge of politically motivated violence has been 
judged to require (offences like preparing to commit 
terrorist acts or directing at any level a terrorist 
organisation). It is central to this account that no 
person can be punished until they have been found 
guilty under a proper, human-rights-abiding 
criminal process, one that looks for proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, puts the burden of establishing 
this on the prosecution, and ideally has a jury on 
hand to give the ﬁ nal verdict. 
The second thread in the law originates within the 
security services, draws its inspiration from the 
Cold War, and has grown in inﬂ uence as counter-
terrorism has come increasingly to be seen as a 
policy area where MI5 and specialist police ofﬁ cers 
take the lead role. Here the overriding principle is 
precautionary rather than punitive. The emphasis is 
not on what has happened but on what might 
happen. The people to move against are not limited 
to those who have done things – the very fact of 
such occurrences is on this analysis evidence of 
failure. The primary foe is the ‘terrorist’ of the 
future, the person who may look innocent, and who 
has done nothing tangibly wrong but who is merely 
biding his (or her) time, waiting to wreak havoc and 
destruction when the moment is right. Intelligence 
is what matters, much more than evidence: the 
latter is useful after an atrocity but the former can 
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stop it occurring in the ﬁ rst place. To do this though, 
intelligence needs to be capable of being acted on: 
suspects need to be stopped in their tracks, 
disrupted, constrained in their movements, locked 
up if possible, or kicked out of the country if they 
are foreign. From this perspective, what matters are 
not criminal prosecutions but administrative 
actions against suspected bad guys; with their 
fetishism of individual liberty and due process, 
human rights and civil liberties law put the country 
at grave risk, seem prepared to sacriﬁ ce the rights 
to life and security of the majority at the behest of 
the obnoxious few.
The Blair and now Brown administrations have tried 
to keep these two contradictory positions in play. 
Control orders began life as a precautionary 
initiative but their legalisation in Parliament 
introduced a range of procedural, criminal-style 
(though not fully criminal) safeguards into their 
operation. The ﬁ rst 90 and now 42 day pre-charge 
detention proposal is a watered down version of the 
full-scale internment power that many wedded to 
the precautionary principle appear to want, but 
even this is being legalised as the various locks 
designed to protect liberty are being readied to be 
snapped into place. The debate over whether to 
allow intercept evidence to be admissible in criminal 
prosecutions – the law ofﬁ cers, the civil liberties 
groups and various senior police ofﬁ cers, judges 
and independent reviewers are in favour; the 
security establishment against – is important 
precisely because it reﬂ ects this great divide 
between those who would follow the criminal route 
and those who prefer to bypass the criminal 
altogether in favour of administrative controls. 
At the moment, the forces mustered in parliament 
and civil society seem poised to push ahead with 
the continued criminalisation of counter-terrorism, 
and in this they enjoy the support of many senior 
ﬁ gures in the executive branch. It is not impossible 
that what we shall see in the years ahead is a falling 
away in use of long-term pre-charge detention 
(whether 28 as at present or 40 + days if Parliament 
votes this option through); an increase in the 
charging and prosecution of terrorist suspects for 
substantive criminal offences (boosted by the ready 
availability of intelligence, albeit with new judicial 
safeguards in place which will change the role of the 
‘ the forces mustered in 
parliament and civil society 
seem poised to push ahead 




trial judge to some extent); and a continued 
judicialisation of administrative powers like the 
control orders so as to make them resemble more 
and more the criminal process they were designed 
to supersede. From the human rights/civil liberties 
perspective this is the optimistic scenario. But the 
history of terrorism both generally and speciﬁ cally 
with regard to Northern Ireland shows that nothing 
can be taken for granted. The politics of the last 
atrocity can be expected at some point or other
to rear their head. A pernicious feature of 
subversive political violence in a democracy lies
in its ability to hijack debate and force the law in 
directions that may be neither necessary nor,
in the long run, desirable. The new Prime Minister 
and Home Secretary dealt with the London and 
Glasgow attempted attacks with impressive calm 
and fortitude, but supposing these assaults had 
worked. Would the civil libertarian line have been 
as easy to hold?
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Counter-terrorism Bill 2008
The Counter-terrorism Bill now before Parliament 
contains many features which have been the 
subject of discussion at the seminars. 
Its centrepiece is authority for the extension
of pre-charge detention to a total of 42 days. 
The power will only be available where the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and a chief ofﬁ cer of
police report that they are satisﬁ ed that there 
are reasonable grounds for believing it to be 
necessary for the purpose of (i) obtaining evidence 
(by questioning or otherwise); or (ii) to preserve 
relevant evidence; or (iii) holding of the suspect 
pending the receipt of results of an examination
or analysis of relevant evidence. When such a 
report is made the Secretary of State may 
then by order declare the power to be available. 
He or she must then lay a statement before 
Parliament explaining the action. Each House
must approve the decision. With the power in place, 
the applications for further detention can then be 
made to a senior judge, and where the pre-charge 
incarceration extends past twenty-eight days in any 
speciﬁ c case, parliament has to be informed. 
The reserve power ceases after 60 days, whereupon 
its operation is required to be made the subject 
of an independent review.
The availability of long periods of pre-charge 
detention does not mean that the Bill does not
also deal with some of the various alternatives to 
detention that have been discussed in recent years. 
Foremost among these is the provision the Bill now 
makes for post-charge questioning, albeit in a way 
that is restricted to the speciﬁ c terrorism offence
in relation to which the charge has been brought
(or concerning which an ofﬁ cial indication has been 
given that a prosecution may be brought). This is
a narrower remit than had been suggested by some 
advocates of this reform. The Bill also makes 
provision for the removal of documents (electronic 
and written) for examination with the outer limit for 
retention being four days. There are also savings
for legally privileged material, but nothing else
(e.g. journalists’ notes). The control order regime, 
put in place as an alternative to the long-term 
detention envisaged in the now superseded
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Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
is toughened up with the Bill containing various 
powers to take ﬁ ngerprints and other samples 
and also a variety of extra powers in relation to
their enforcement. 
The Bill also contains a miscellany of other 
provisions, concerned with the disclosure of 
information with regard to the intelligence services, 
the prosecution and punishment of terrorist and 
terrorist-motivated offences (including new 
requirements for notiﬁ cation where such crimes 
have been committed) , and asset freezing. Among 
the more controversial elements in the new Bill
is likely to be the new set of sections on inquests.
The plan is for inquests to be convened before 
specially appointed coroners without a jury where 
this is said to be necessitated ‘in the interests
of national security’ or ‘in the interests of the 
relationship between the United Kingdom and 
another country’ or ‘otherwise in the public interest’. 
It is planned to allow action under these provisions 
immediately upon their coming into force, thereby 
making it possible to act with regard to inquests 
that are already in progress but which have not
yet been completed. 
Viewed overall the Bill deepens further the range
of criminal law, administrative and other executive 
powers that can be deployed against persons 
judged to be a terrorist threat. The terrorism laws 
are now unrecognisable from the slim, temporary 
emergency measure introduced by Home Secretary 
Roy Jenkins in November 1974, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Birmingham pub bombings. 
Following on from 1974, further IRA-inspired 
legislation was enacted in 1976, 1984, 1989 and 
1996. Since the IRA’s cessation of hostilities,
we have now had more general anti-terrorism 
statutes enacted in 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006 and
now most likely once again in 2008. Will this 
measure be the last? 
A feature of the present proposals has been the 
degree of consultation that there has been over the 
extended pre-charge detention provisions; however 
this has been a debate about lengths of time – 14 
days, 28 days, 42 days or 56 days – all of which 
would have been regarded with horror even by the 
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most determined proponents of anti-terrorism laws 
in the 1970s: the seven days allowed in 1974 was 
regarded at the time, and until very recently, as
a major invasion of civil liberties. To this extent the 
debate around this Bill is an indicator of quite how 
markedly common sense in this ﬁ eld has shifted




One of the running points of major difference
in the seminars was as to the advisability of the 
availability of intercept evidence in criminal 
prosecution for terrorism and terrorism-related 
offences. The government has now decided to 
proceed with further investigations into the viability 
of such a change in the law, on the assumption
that – as long as certain basic safeguards can be 
effectively implemented – then it is right in principle 
that such evidence should be capable of being 
placed before the courts. There is understandable 
anxiety on the part of the intelligence community 
that the exposure of such material to public view – 
albeit only in the context of a criminal trial – might 
have damaging consequences for their counter-
terrorism operations. The view of the majority of 
lawyers and civil libertarians is that these concerns 
are capable of being effectively addressed and that 
the criminal law orientation of counter-terrorism 
law would be given a further boost by the change. 
The matter has now been remitted to an expert 
review body for further study of the logistics of
the change.
Conor Gearty is Director of the Centre for the Study 
of Human Rights and Professor of Human Rights 
Law at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. He has published widely on 
terrorism, civil liberties and human rights. He is also 
a barrister and was a founding member of Matrix 
chambers from where he continues to practice.
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The Seminars
‘The role of civil society in the management of security
 in a democracy’
Centre for the Study of Human Rights seminar series
funded by the New Security Challenges Programme
of the Economic and Social Research Council.
Seminar one: the proper role of the legal profession
(1 March 2005)
Seminar two: the role of the media (5 July 2005)
Seminar three: the proper role of the judiciary (24 January 2006)
Seminar four: the role of civil society (8 March 2006)
Seminar ﬁ ve: the proper role of politicians (1 November 2006)
Seminar six: the place of the Human Rights Act (5 June 2007)




‘Human rights and counter-terrorism: re-framing the debate’
Centre for the Study of Human Rights conference
funded by the New Security Challenges Programme
of the Economic and Social Research Council.
Friday 5 October 2007
Conference sessions:
Debate: do we need special counter-terrorism laws?
Professor Conor Gearty and Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman
Chair: Francesca Klug OBE 
Comparative counter-terrorism: what can we learn? 
Issues: Extraordinary Rendition; Intercept Evidence;
‘Setting aside’ rights
Speakers: Professor Deborah Pearlstein (USA);
Antoine Garapon (France); Professor Andrew Lynch (Australia)
Chair: Professor Emeritus Carol Harlow
New directions in terrorism law 
Lord Carlile of Berriew QC
Chair: Professor Conor Gearty
Plenary: terrorism law and human rights
Professor Conor Gearty led a discussion of main themes
of the day and the future inter-relationship of terrorism
law and human rights
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